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Abstract 
This paper provides a review and assessment of the extensive literature on the political 
determination of environmental regulation. A promising theoretical literature has emerged 
relatively recently that provides models of the political interaction of government with various 
interest groups in the setting of environmental standards and the choice of regulatory 
instruments. A large empirical literature supports such models, finding evidence of the influence 
of interest groups but also evidence that net social benefits are often an important determinant of 
environmental policy choices. We then take up the issue of environmental federalism and the 
large and growing theoretical literature that addresses the competitive “race to the bottom.” The 
paper concludes with a brief look at the evolution of environmental policy and finds that 
economics has come to play a growing role both in the setting of standards for environmental 
quality and in the design of regulatory measures. 
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1 
The Political Economy of Environmental Policy 
Wallace E. Oates and Paul R. Portney∗ 
The term political economy has a long and rich history. In its earliest manifestations, it 
meant essentially economics; indeed, the two terms were basically synonyms in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries (Groenewegen 1987). However, as economics came to denote the discipline, 
political economy has assumed a variety of shades of meaning. It is now, in fact, a rather elusive 
term that typically refers to the study of the collective or political processes through which public 
economic decisions are made.  
For our purposes in this essay, we shall settle for this admittedly broad and somewhat 
vague definition. Our concern here is with the determinants of actual decisions on environmental 
programs. Environmental economics has much to say about the design of efficient and effective 
policy measures for protecting the environment. But when we turn to actual policy, we find, 
often to our dismay, that existing measures or institutions do not stack up at all well in terms of 
these guidelines. How are we to understand such political failure?  
In this paper, we shall explore the various political, or collective choice, facets of 
environmental policymaking. Our treatment will focus on the political economy of domestic 
environmental policy. In addition, our study is more or less limited to the experience of countries 
with elected governments—in particular the United States and the nations of Western Europe. 
Both existing theory and more rigorous empirical work tend to relate to these countries.1 
We begin with two sections covering a few preliminary and general observations on the 
various theoretical and empirical approaches that have been employed to study regulatory 
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behavior. Our sense is that certain of them are more directly relevant to understanding the 
determination of environmental policy than others. More specifically, a framework in which  
interest groups vie with one another in a political setting seems to us the most promising 
approach to a positive theory of environmental regulation. In section 3, we review the fairly 
extensive theoretical literature that sets forth this approach. This body of work draws heavily on 
the recent work on the positive theory of international trade, which has developed models of 
competing interest groups that seek to restrict trade in ways that promote their own interests. The 
parallels to the determination of environmental policy are straightforward.  
Section 4 turns to a survey of the wide-ranging empirical work on the political economy 
of environmental regulation. This body of research encompasses a vast array of studies that 
range from largely qualitative case studies to more formal and rigorous econometric 
investigations. These studies provide support for the view that environmental measures are 
influenced by specific interest groups, and also that (at least in some cases) the social benefits 
and costs play a role in determining outcomes.  
Section 5 of the paper moves on to a description and assessment of the now vast and rich 
literature on environmental federalism. The issue of the respective roles of various levels of 
government is contentious on both sides of the Atlantic. Our sense is that the race-to-the-bottom 
arguments that are the basis for current pressures to harmonize (or centralize) environmental 
policies across jurisdictional boundaries are not so compelling as some argue. There are 
important responsibilities for governments at all levels in the design and implementation of 
environmental programs. And it is important to get these functions aligned properly in the 
vertical structure of public decisionmaking.  
We conclude the paper with some reflections on trends in the political economy of 
environmental decisionmaking—most notably, the encouraging tendency in recent years to give 
more weight to economic analysis in the design of environmental policy.  
1. On Theories of Regulation: Some Preliminaries 
There are a number of distinct approaches to understanding regulatory activity. The 
traditional neoclassical and normative approach sees regulatory measures as one means for 
correcting allocative distortions in a market system. In the case of environmental policy, the 
standard theory of externalities provides a basic explanation for tendencies in a market economy 
toward excessive levels of pollution. From this approach follows a clearcut prescription for 
correction of this distortion: the internalization of the external costs through either a system of Resources for the Future  Oates and Portney 
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taxes on polluting activities equal to marginal social damage or a system of tradable emissions 
permits that restricts aggregate pollution to the efficient level and, at the same time, guides 
abatement activities into a least-cost pattern.2 
But this is the normative theory of environmental regulation. It emerges from an 
analytical exercise involving the maximization of social welfare. As such, it presumes implicitly 
an enlightened public sector that designs and implements social programs for environmental 
protection with the sole objective of promoting the well-being of the polity as a whole (i.e., some 
weighted average of individual utilities). This, we know, is not how social policies typically 
come into being, which leads to the search for positive models that can describe the actual 
determination of social policy. 
One such conceptual construct is the widely employed median-voter model. In this 
framework, social choices that are made directly by voters or through their elected 
representatives reflect the median of the most preferred outcomes of the individuals in the 
relevant social group.3 One familiar and popular adaptation (Downs 1957) extends the model to a 
setting of two political parties in which competition for votes leads to outcomes that converge on 
the preferred outcome of the median-voter. And as Bergstrom (1979) has shown, under certain 
conditions the median-voter outcome will satisfy the first-order conditions for Pareto-efficiency. 
This is of particular interest, since it provides us with a case where the actual outcome of a 
plausible process of political decisionmaking satisfies the conditions from our normative model 
for efficient social choice. One can’t push this too far, for the Bergstrom conditions for such a 
coincidence of outcomes are admittedly restrictive; moreover, there are many realistic 
complications (such as a multidimensional policy space) that create serious problems for the 
model. But in its defense, it has had some success in explaining a substantial range of social 
choice outcomes.4 
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Alternatively, we may see such public intervention in terms of its capacity to reduce the “transactions costs” 
associated with achieving an efficient outcome. See, for example, Zerbe and McCurdy (1999). As Coase (1960) has 
shown us, there may well be cases where voluntary negotiations among a small group of affected parties can 
effectively resolve an externality with no need for public regulatory measures. Or, if the transactions costs are 
sufficiently low and the link between cause and effect sufficiently clear, a well-functioning tort system that makes 
polluters liable for the costs they impose on society can constitute an efficient system of pollution control.    
3
Black (1948) is the source for the first modern treatment of the median-voter theorem. See Mueller (1989) for an 
excellent survey of the more recent literature on the median-voter model. 
4
One such application involves the use of the model to provide a framework for the estimation of demand functions 
for local public goods (Borcherding and Deacon 1972; Bergstrom and Goodman 1973). Assuming that the outcome 
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Let us note one obvious prediction of our normative and median-voter models. Since 
environmental externalities can involve significant social damages and economic distortions, one 
would expect the emergence of policies that restrict polluting activities—as has been the case in 
most places. In other words, and at this most simple level, the predictions of models that lead to 
efficient (or quasi-efficient) outcomes find some support in real-world outcomes. But again, we 
must not push too hard on this framework. When we ask the harder questions concerning the 
stringency of these programs and the choice of policy instruments, things quickly become more 
complex and less clear. But it is worthwhile to note at the outset that our basic normative 
framework (linked to a positive model through something like the median-voter model) does 
have some, if limited, explanatory power. 
There are other theories of social choice and, in particular, regulation that are potentially 
important here. A major (and radical) attempt to provide a positive theory of regulation 
originated with Stigler (1971), with subsequent development by Peltzman (1976) and others. 
This approach sees regulation not as a means to promote the general welfare by mitigating 
efficiency losses from market failure, but rather as a form of wealth transfers. In Stigler’s (1971, 
3) view, “Regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefit.” This so-called capture theory of regulation sees regulated industries not as the victim of 
regulatory measures but rather as their beneficiary. Measures enacted by “captured” agencies 
may take the form, for example, of direct monetary subsidies or, alternatively, of less direct 
assistance in the form of barriers to entry into the regulated industry. 
Although the capture theory may describe some classes of regulatory activity reasonably 
well, it does not seem to us very successful as a positive theory of environmental policy. As we 
have suggested, environmental measures come about largely as a result of the real or perceived 
social damages that are borne across the social spectrum from polluting activities. A theory that 
relates regulation directly to social welfare maximization thus doesn’t seem too far off the mark. 
Environmental measures typically impose costs—sometimes significant costs—on the sources of 
polluting activities. For this reason, it seems misleading at best to describe environmental 
measures as instigated by the regulated—that is, by polluting industries. We surely find certain 
                                                                                                                                                             
in each community represents a point on the demand curve of the median voter, this literature has generated 
plausible econometric estimates of the demand functions for a number of public services provided by local 
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cases (which we will examine later) where such measures have been manipulated into a form 
that provides specific benefits to at least some regulated parties, but to argue that environmental 
policy has its basic impetus in the designs of polluting industries seems misplaced.5 
A more attractive model of environmental regulatory choice is one in which interest 
groups vie with one another through a political process to determine the extent and form of 
environmental policies. The problem with this approach, as Stigler (1971, 3) observed, is that 
such a view can lead to the position that a regulatory outcome “defies rational explanation,” 
being the result of “an imponderable, a constantly and unpredictably shifting mixture of forces of 
the most diverse nature.” 
Fortunately, as Becker (1983) showed in his seminal paper, things are not that intractable. 
In fact, it is not even the case that such political processes lead invariably to distorted, inefficient 
outcomes. Becker’s analysis finds that competition among interest groups for political influence 
can have some important efficiency-enhancing properties. Moreover, some recent work on 
interest group politics pushes this further; in the Becker spirit, this work finds that such processes 
lead to political equilibria that can be economically efficient. Aidt (1998), for example, lays out 
an interesting model in which competition among interest groups leads to an efficient 
internalization of detrimental externalities. In Aidt’s model (which we shall examine in more 
detail later), government pursues its own goals, seeking a mixture of political contributions and 
social welfare. So long as the interest groups represent the interests of their constituencies 
faithfully, their contributions induce public decisionmakers both to select efficient levels of 
externality-generating activities and to employ efficient regulatory instruments. Such models at 
least remind us that the outcomes from the political interplay of diverse interest groups need not 
be inherently distortionary, although fully efficient outcomes are admittedly special cases. 
It seems to us that approaches that explicitly recognize this interaction of different 
interest groups are the most promising for an understanding of environmental policy. The stage 
upon which the environmental policy process plays itself out is typically one in which 
environmental advocacy groups and potentially regulated parties (which can include 
corporations, other levels of government, and even individuals) push their cases, and where 
regulators may even bring to bear basic measures of social costs and benefits.  
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In this process, it seems clear that institutions matter. Environmentalists, business trade 
organizations, and other interest groups interact first in the determination of environmental 
legislation. But this is not the end of the story. The implementation of such legislation by 
environmental agencies provides another arena in which divergent interests must be reconciled in 
the actual design, administration, and enforcement of policy. Through the selective enforcement 
of specific environmental measures, regulatory agencies may either weaken the measures or 
expand their scope and effectiveness. Some statutes actually allow the regulator to negotiate with 
the source to determine the form and extent of compliance. Finally, key decisions often end up in 
the hands of the judiciary, as the courts interpret the intent of legislation and the faithfulness of 
its implementation by administrative agencies. The analysis of the political economy of 
environmental policy must thus encompass the institutional setting in which the interplay of 
interest groups takes place.  
2. On the Empirical Study of the Political Economy of Environmental Regulation:  
A Few More Preliminaries 
To assess the role of different interests in the determination of policy measures, one can 
look in a relatively informal, historical way at various policy decisions through qualitative case 
studies. Such studies abound in the literature—and frequently provide valuable insights into the 
political economy of particular environmental programs. Ackerman and Hassler (1981), for 
example, provide a penetrating account of the evolution of the Clean Air Act in the United 
States, with particular attention to the crucial role played by coal interests. More recently, 
Leveque (1996) has assembled a series of case studies in Europe that describe different 
dimensions of the environmental policy process in the emerging European Union (EU). At the 
same time, there are available somewhat more formal approaches that allow us to make 
statistical inferences about the groups or issues that figured significantly in the policymaking 
process. And these have been widely used in the environmental literature to shed light on how 
environmental decisions have, in fact, been made. 
One such approach examines the “revealed preferences” of the regulatory agency. 
McFadden (1975, 1976) set forth a statistical method in which the actual decisions of a public 
agency can be used to infer the criteria that gave rise to these choices. Making use of a 
multinomial logit model, the approach essentially selects a set of decision rules that can explain 
the observed choices. As an application, McFadden used the model to explore the determinants 
of freeway planning decisions by the California Division of Highways. Resources for the Future  Oates and Portney 
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More generally, one can posit a relationship between a class of decisions regarding, say, 
the regulation of a set of industries or pollutants, as the dependent variable and, as explanatory 
variables, the behavior (e.g., contributions, lobbying activities, testimony before regulatory 
bodies) of interest groups, along with other factors, such as the toxicity of the pollutants and the 
cost of controlling them. We can then estimate econometrically the impact of each of these 
determinants on a series of environmental decisions. As we shall see, this general approach has 
been used quite effectively to study a variety of environmental programs—it has allowed us to 
explore ex post facto who has “called the tune” for various kinds of environmental measures. 
An alternative approach involves the examination of voting behavior. Some studies, for 
example, look at the voting records of individual legislators and then relate these records to the 
characteristics of the politicians themselves or their constituencies. In other cases, environmental 
measures have been determined by direct vote in a referendum; under this form of 
decisionmaking, we can look directly at the pattern of votes across precincts and relate these 
patterns to the characteristics of the voters to find out what determined the outcomes. Thus, we 
find in the sections that follow a number of approaches to uncovering the role of interest groups 
and decisionmaking procedures in the setting of environmental policy.  
3. Toward a Positive Theory of Environmental Regulation6 
As we suggested earlier, the most promising approach to understanding the actual form 
and stringency of environmental measures appears to us to be one that tries to understand how 
interest groups interact in a specified political setting with environmental policies as the 
outcome. This general approach has its roots in some early pieces that sought to explain why 
existing environmental policies had taken an inefficient and inferior form rather than the kinds of 
measures suggested by economic analysis. 
In one of these early papers, Buchanan and Tullock (1975), drawing on basic models of 
the firm, showed that emissions standards (or more precisely, quotas on polluting outputs) would 
generally be preferred to effluent taxes by firms themselves, where these measures take a form 
that effectively limits entry. In such a setting, environmental regulations can produce a cartel-
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type outcome with increased profits for existing firms. For example, it is easy to see that 
environmental measures that prescribe more stringent standards for new than for existing plants 
(as is often the case, since retrofitting can be expensive) may be welcomed by industrial interests 
as a new barrier to entry into the polluting industry.  
This general line of analysis was pursued in some subsequent papers. Dewees (1983), for 
example, laid out very nicely a systematic treatment of how various policy instruments affected 
the well-being of both industrial interests (including shareholders) and workers in the affected 
industries. Dewees confirmed and extended the findings of Buchanan and Tullock; he showed, 
for example, that industrial interest groups could well prefer systems of marketable emissions 
permits to effluent standards if the permits were distributed free of charge to existing sources.7 
This general line of analysis thus examined the implications of different policy 
instruments for the welfare of interest groups and generated a number of insights into just why 
we would expect to find opposition in certain quarters to efficient and effective policy measures. 
It is straightforward, for example, to show that a system of pollution taxes (or tradable permits 
distributed by an initial auction) is likely to prove more costly to polluting industries than a less 
efficient assignment of emissions quotas—or even the required adoption of a specified control 
technology. The point here is that under a system of taxes (or auctioned tradable permits), 
polluting firms must not only bear the costs of their pollution control activities but, in addition, 
pay taxes on (or buy permits for) their remaining discharges. And some empirical studies have 
suggested that even where a command-and-control program produces an inefficient pattern of 
abatement efforts, the extra control costs may be dwarfed by the taxes that must be paid under a 
regime of pollution levies (e.g., Seskin et al. 1983). In consequence, it should not be surprising to 
find that industrial interests have often shown little enthusiasm for the systems of environmental 
taxes championed by economists.8 
Those first-generation studies of positive theories of environmental policy thus sought to 
explain how various policy measures affected interest groups. But they did not take the next step 
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Opposition from industrial (and other) interests in the early days of environmental legislation also had its source in 
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of actually predicting outcomes. It is one thing to show that policy measure A will be favored by 
interest group B, but it is much more complicated to show how this measure will be received by 
interest groups (some of which may support it and others not) and then how this will play out in 
a process of interaction among these groups to produce a policy outcome (Hahn 1990). 
The second generation of work on the positive theory of environmental regulation has 
taken up this challenging issue. The basic approach involves setting out a public choice or 
political setting in which competing interests, taking the form of lobbying groups, provide 
support in one form or another (often monetary support for their preferred candidate), and then, 
making use of game-theoretic analytical techniques, characterizing outcomes under differing 
conditions. Such models can, for example, provide an explicit rationale for the choice of 
command-and-control instruments over more efficient incentive-based measures under certain 
circumstances.  
This body of work draws heavily on recent research into the positive theory of 
international trade—research that seeks to explain the introduction of tariffs and other 
impediments to free trade through the political interplay of interest groups (Hillman 1989; 
Grossman and Helpman 1994).9 It is useful, following Grossman and Helpman (1994), to 
distinguish between two strands in this literature. The first envisions the political setting as one 
of political competition between opposing candidates (or parties). The competing candidates 
announce the policy measures that they will introduce if elected, and then organized interest 
groups decide which candidate to support (e.g., Hillman and Ursprung 1992).  
The second approach to the study of endogenous policy determination involves a setting 
in which an incumbent government seeks to maximize its political support through the choice of 
policy measures. Under this political-support model, the interest or lobbying groups offer 
contributions, and the government determines policy so as to maximize the likelihood of being 
reelected. This typically involves the maximization of an objective function that includes as 
arguments both the general welfare of the electorate and the contributions from the interest 
groups (e.g., Aidt 1998). Under the latter approach, involving the “common agency model of 
politics,” one of the interesting findings (mentioned earlier) is that if all agents have their 
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interests represented accurately by an interest group, then the political equilibrium is socially 
efficient. All external effects become effectively internalized through the political process, with 
the result that the policymaker chooses both the efficient policy instrument and the efficient level 
of regulation; in the case of environmental policy, this is a Pigouvian tax. 
To get a better sense of these quite striking results, it may prove helpful to treat all this a 
bit more formally. We shall follow Aidt (1998) here; his formulation builds on Grossman and 
Helpman (1994). In Aidt’s model, the government’s objective function encompasses both social 






where W is a Benthamite social welfare function, Θ is a weighting parameter, and C
i is the 
contribution from interest group i.10 The variables p, q, and t
e represent producer prices, 
consumer prices, and emissions taxes, respectively. Each citizen is a generalist consumer and a 
shareholder in one industry (product) and is adversely affected by polluting emissions associated 
with production. 
Aidt limits the government to two policy instruments: taxes on emissions and product 
taxes or subsidies. The government can use these instruments both to control emissions and to 
redistribute income. Each citizen receives an equal lump-sum share of the tax revenue collected. 
In the Aidt model, each interest group represents all those citizens who hold shares of a 
particular industry. However, rather than simply focusing on increasing the profit earned by the 
industry, the interest group faithfully represents all of its members’ interests. Thus, the interest 
group is concerned with each of the elements affecting its members’ welfare. The objective 
function for each interest group, W
i(p,q,t
e), is thus the sum of its members’ utility. Following 
Grossman and Helpman (1994), it can be shown that the optimal contribution for each interest 
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With this in place, the insight of concern here—namely, the existence of an efficient 
lobbying outcome—follows in a straightforward manner.11 If all N industries are represented by 
an interest group (and because each citizen holds shares of only one industry), then all citizens 
are represented by an interest group. In this case, the government’s objective function collapses 
to 
(3) G(p,q,t
e) = (Θ + 1)W(p,q,t
e)-ΣK
i  
and the optimal tax levels for the government are the same as those for the social welfare 
function: product taxes that equal zero and emissions taxes that equal marginal social damage.12  
Deviations from efficient outcomes in this framework result from the failure of lobbying 
groups to emerge to represent certain interests. Aidt does not examine the formation of interest 
groups. He simply takes their existence as given and assumes that they have overcome the free-
rider and associated challenges that confront the organization of these groups. However, the 
basic theory of public goods leads us, in fact, to expect such failures in organization. In his 
classic work, Olson (1965) laid out a theory of special interest groups in which he explored the 
conditions under which effective lobby groups were likely to emerge. As Olson taught us, the 
basic free-rider problem limits the capacity for individuals with common interests to organize to 
obtain a collective benefit. Powerful lobbies are typically those that perform some function in 
addition to providing purely collective goods: they provide direct services to their members or 
have various tools of coercion at their disposal to enforce membership on those who benefit from 
their activities. So it comes as no surprise to find that certain interest groups—business trade 
associations, for example, which constitute relatively small and fairly homogeneous groups—are 
able to organize and represent their collective interests more effectively than larger and more 
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Distortions in both emissions taxes and product taxes or subsidies typically arise when not all industries are 
represented by a lobby group. In this more realistic setting, Aidt finds another interesting result. If only some interest 
groups contribute to campaigns, marginal damages continue to enter only the argument for the optimal (from the 
government’s perspective) emissions taxes. For an interesting application of this framework to pollution taxes in an 
open-economy setting, see Fredriksson (1997).  Resources for the Future  Oates and Portney 
12 
diffuse groups, like consumers. Thus, it is easy to see how inefficient policy outcomes can 
emerge as a result of incomplete representation through interest groups.13  
In fact, from this perspective, what does seem surprising is the extent to which 
environmental advocacy groups have mobilized their constituencies so effectively. The benefits 
from programs to improve air quality on a national scale, for example, would appear to represent 
an Olsonian large-group case, where it would be extremely difficult to organize environmental 
interests. But in seeming contradiction to the prediction of the theory, environmental groups have 
proved to be a very powerful force in the policy arena. In the case of air quality management in 
the United States, for example, the efforts of these groups were clearly very important in 
obtaining at least some standards that appear to be more stringent than the economically efficient 
ones. Likewise in Europe, a variety of environmental groups have had great influence on 
measures for environmental protection. In several northern European countries, green interest 
groups have formed their own political parties and have become part of a governing majority.14  
The issue of interest groups is a complicated one in the context of environmental policy. 
At the level of pure theory, one can finesse this issue with a very general framework that 
includes “n” interest (or lobbying) groups, each of which contributes money or other efforts to 
influence policy decisions. In more concrete applications, we find in some simple models cases 
of two opposing groups: environmental advocacy organizations in opposition to trade 
associations representing business interests. But the interplay of interests is often much more 
complex than this; in some instances, the same individuals may find that they wear different hats 
in that they may be part of several different interest groups. Moreover, there may exist a 
substantial number of groups with a stake in the choice of policy instruments and their level of 
stringency: environmental organizations, business interests, labor unions, administrative and trial 
lawyers, government agencies themselves, as well as the general public. For example, in one 
applied study of Forest Service decisionmaking, Martin et al. (1996) identified seven interest 
groups that had a stake in oil and gas leasing on federal lands: the oil company seeking the 
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notably with a wide range of empirical studies that find numerous instances where individuals in fact eschew free-
rider opportunities and voluntarily band together for purposes of mutual advantage. Resources for the Future  Oates and Portney 
13 
leases, local environmental organizations, the local tourist industry, the local timber industry, 
local retail and wholesale merchants, local government units, and the federal government (the 
agency itself). In any particular application (and we shall examine several in the empirical 
section of our survey), the identification and characterization of the relevant interest groups are 
an essential and challenging part of the analysis. 
The actual choice of regulatory instruments is thus an outcome of a process of interaction 
between policymakers and the interest groups that bring pressure to bear on these decisions. In a 
recent and interesting approach to characterizing this process, Keohane et al. (1998) have 
suggested that we envision a political “market” in which interest groups provide a demand for 
environmental measures and where legislators, offering levels of support for competing policy 
instruments, constitute the supply side of the market. In this framework, the legislative outcome 
(i.e., the choice of policy instrument) is determined by an equilibrium between the aggregated 
demands of the interest groups and the aggregate political-support supply function of the 
legislators. The “currency” in this political market encompasses not only monetary contributions 
but other forms of support for the legislators’ reelection. 
Although the recent and more formal theoretical work on the political economy of 
environmental policy is impressive and promising, it would seem to be subject to certain 
limitations. The formal models typically treat government as a monolithic entity in the sense that 
they characterize “the” public decisionmaker in terms of a single objective function. One might 
interpret this objective function as somehow representing the collection of public sector 
“interests,” but this is not fully satisfactory. As we have noted, the process that generates 
environmental outcomes is typically a complex and rich one that involves not only legislation but 
also administrative implementation at the bureaucratic level (often a complicated process in 
itself) and sometimes judicial review. It is hard to see how strictly formal modeling can ever 
capture the full range of this complexity. This most assuredly does not imply that these 
theoretical exercises are without value; we have already noted some of the important insights 
they have provided. Rather, it should remind us that case studies of particular environmental 
programs must go beyond the basic theory to consider the course of the regulatory program 
through the maze of the institutional structure that produces the ultimate outcome.  
As a transition to the next section on empirical studies, it will be useful here to 
summarize in more concrete form some of the important insights that the existing positive theory 
of environmental regulation has provided into policy choices. As we noted earlier, a primary 
motivation for this literature has been the observed divergence of actual environmental policy 
from the efficient measures suggested by economic theory. And this has been done largely by Resources for the Future  Oates and Portney 
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showing that less efficient, command-and-control instruments can, in quite realistic 
circumstances, be more beneficial to certain important interest groups than more efficient, 
incentive-based policy measures.15 
First, as we have discussed, certain kinds of command-and-control policies can erect 
effective barriers to entry. It is, in fact, possible for such measures to raise the profits of existing 
firms above those that would exist in the absence of any environmental measures.16 But even 
where this is not the case, it is likely that relatively inefficient control measures will be less 
costly to the polluting firm than a system of effluent taxes involving both control costs and tax 
payments (or a system of tradable permits, in which firms must purchase permits to validate their 
residual waste discharges). 
Second, environmental organizations may also look unfavorably on certain incentive-
based instruments.17 Many environmentalists object to such instruments on philosophical 
grounds, espousing the view that pollution taxes or systems of tradable emissions permits 
involve “putting the environment up for sale” and are, for this reason, immoral and unacceptable. 
Environmental organizations must thus be careful not to alienate their members by supporting 
such policy measures.18 Moreover, environmental groups may have serious reservations about 
such policy instruments in practice. If, for example, the environmental authority sets too low a 
tax rate, then the environmental objective will not be realized. And it may not be an easy matter 
to raise tax rates when needed. 
Finally, the literature has also clarified some important differences among incentive-
based instruments. In the United States, some environmentalists, for example, have shown much 
more interest in quantity instruments (systems of tradable permits) than in price instruments 
(pollution taxes). They have found that a policy instrument that explicitly limits levels of 
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Maloney and McCormick (1982) show the precise conditions under which regulation will increase profits. 
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polluting activities can more reliably achieve environmental goals than a price instrument the 
response to which is uncertain. And taking this a step further, polluting industries have been 
more receptive to such quantity instruments if the permits are allocated initially free of charge 
(through some kind of grandfathering scheme) rather than auctioned off. In this case, rather than 
having to purchase permits to validate emissions, the firms receive without cost a valuable asset 
that can either be used to validate their own emissions or be sold for a profit. Systems of tradable 
permits with a free initial distribution can thus achieve support from interest groups that may not 
be forthcoming for other forms of incentive-based instruments.19  
4. Empirical Studies of the Political Economy of Environmental Protection 
There is a wide array of empirical work that explores the actual determination of 
environmental standards in different places and at different times. It is impossible to characterize 
this work in any simple way, but one theme does emerge in nearly all these studies—namely, 
that actual environmental measures bear the imprint in various ways of the interest groups that 
have taken part in the debate and design of these measures. Even where, for example, very 
stringent policies have been adopted in response to environmental concerns, there are typically 
provisions in the legislation (or subsequent implementing regulations) to accommodate the 
particular interests of those who must bear the costs. To take one broad case, Ekins and Speck 
(1999), in their comprehensive survey of the use of environmental taxes in Europe, find that in 
nearly all the European nations, the implementation of such taxes includes a wide array of 
significant exemptions and tax relief for particular sectors—often to allay concerns about the 
adverse effects of the taxes on competitiveness.  
The first environmental application of the formal revealed preference approach was that 
of Magat et al. (1986). They analyzed the technologies that a diverse set of industries were 
required to install by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to control emissions of 
two water pollutants: total suspended solids (TSS) and biochemical oxygen demand (BOD). This 
work was prompted by the observation that in some industries (or subcategories within an 
industry), some firms were required to spend a great deal per unit of BOD or TSS removed, 
while others were asked to spend much less. Among many other things in this comprehensive 
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study, the analyses suggested that EPA—at least in its standard setting for TSS and BOD—gave 
very little weight to economic efficiency and appeared not to be influenced either by industry 
participation in the rulemaking process or by the number of plants that might be shut down as a 
result of the control requirements. What did appear to matter was the strength of the trade 
association that represented the affected industries and also the profitability of the industries.  
As we saw in the preceding section on positive theories of environmental regulation, a 
number of recent contributions envision an objective function for the policymaker (or legislator) 
that consists of a weighted average of two kinds of arguments: the contributions of the various 
interest groups and a term reflecting the general social welfare. In this regard, it is interesting to 
find in several recent empirical studies that measures of social welfare have a significant impact 
on regulatory outcomes as well as variables indicating the influence of specific interest groups. 
For example, in an econometric study of pesticide regulation in the United States, Cropper et al. 
(1992) found that the probability that EPA disallowed the continued use of a particular pesticide 
ingredient depended largely on the estimated benefits and costs of such a restriction; more 
specifically, both the economic benefits of the ingredient to producers and the degree of health 
risk it posed were significant determinants of EPA decisions. The explanatory power of the 
model increased markedly with the addition of some interest group variables (representing 
business and environmental groups), suggesting that both net social value and interest group 
pressures mattered in decisions concerning discontinuing the use of particular ingredients.20 
On a quite different U.S. issue, Hoagland and Farrow (1996) likewise found that the 
planning decisions made by the secretary of the Interior concerning the sale of leases for offshore 
gas and oil drilling depended not only on political variables but also on the estimated net social 
value attached to the various sites. And in a third case, Hird (1990), in a study of Superfund 
expenditures to clean up hazardous waste sites in the United States, found that the chief 
determinant of the pace and funding of cleanup at particular sites was the site’s hazard ranking—
a measure of its public health risk—with only more modest influence from interested legislators. 
Such studies thus provide some support for the view that many environmental policy decisions 
represent a kind of amalgam of group interests and general social welfare maximization. 
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In certain of the theoretical political-support models that we have examined, the 
formulation is one in which policy decisions depend significantly on financial contributions from 
interest groups. There is some evidence to support this view in studies of environmental policies. 
Coates (1996), for example, examined the impact of campaign contributions on the voting 
behavior of members of the U.S. House of Representatives on a set of amendments to 
wilderness-designation legislation for federal lands in California and Oregon. Such legislation 
effectively protects these lands from commercial development, so the issue is essentially jobs 
versus wilderness protection. Coates’s estimation of a series of probit equations suggests that 
campaign contributions had some effect on legislators’ positions and voting patterns on the issue. 
There are some tricky issues of interpretation here, however. As Stratmann (1991) has pointed 
out, contributions may have the purpose of helping the reelection of a candidate whose position 
coincides with that of the contributor, or they may have the intent of changing the position of a 
legislator with a view opposing that of the contributor. At any rate, Coates finds that 
contributions had their intended effect, although these effects were not sufficiently large to alter 
the overall outcome. 
Interest groups can also form along regional lines. And there is some evidence to suggest 
that support for certain environmental measures has, to some extent, reflected the economic self-
interest of specific regions. Two studies in the United States, for example, have found that 
provisions in the Clean Air Act that were especially costly in rapidly growing areas received 
disproportionate support from areas that stood to lose economic activity to these areas. Crandall 
(1983) found evidence in congressional voting patterns that reflected much stronger support in 
northern jurisdictions for measures that placed more stringent control requirements on new 
sources and that limited the growth in pollution in relatively clean areas; such measures resulted 
in relatively higher control costs in the more rapidly growing southern and western areas in the 
United States. Pashigian (1985) likewise found some support for the “locational competition 
hypothesis.” His analysis (like that of Crandall) suggests that the policy of limiting incremental 
pollution in clean areas (known as the “prevention of significant deterioration”) derived 
significant support from those regions that would gain a competitive advantage from the 
measure. 
Finally, we note that our treatment has been wholly in the context of democratic systems 
where interest groups can express their preferences through various political processes. The 
setting is obviously different in more autocratic systems. Congleton (1992) has, in fact, found 
that this is an important distinction for purposes of environmental management. He suggests that 
we should expect more stringent environmental regulations in democratic than in authoritarian Resources for the Future  Oates and Portney 
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regimes, and his findings support this proposition. More specifically, his estimates indicate that 
democratic countries were much more likely to support stringent limitations on 
chlorofluorocarbon emissions under the Montreal Protocol and actually to reduce emissions of 
such gases. Likewise, Murdoch and Sandler (1997) find that the extent of political and civil 
freedoms had a positive impact on reductions in chlorofluorocarbon emissions in the late 1980s. 
Political systems clearly influence the extent of environmental protection.  
5. Environmental Federalism 
As we have discussed, institutional structure is of central importance in the process of 
environmental decisionmaking. One key dimension of this structure is the vertical division of 
policymaking responsibilities among the different levels of government. This brings us to the 
issue of the respective roles in theory and in practice of central and decentralized public 
agencies, in both the design and the implementation of environmental measures.21 
Here again, there is a body of normative theory from which to derive some basic 
precepts. Within the field of public economics, the subfield of fiscal federalism addresses this set 
of issues, in particular the distribution of functions among levels of government (e.g., see Oates 
1999). The term fiscal here is unduly restrictive; in fact, the so-called principles of fiscal 
federalism extend to regulatory matters as well. From a normative perspective, the issue here is 
one of aligning specific responsibilities and regulatory instruments with the different levels of 
government so as best to achieve our social objectives. 
The basic idea that runs through this literature is that the responsibility for providing a 
particular service should be placed with the smallest jurisdiction whose boundaries encompass 
the various benefits and costs associated with the provision of the service.22 By structuring 
decisionmaking in this way, the levels of public services can be tailored to the specific 
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circumstances—the tastes of residents, the costs of production, and other peculiar local 
conditions—of each jurisdiction. It is straightforward to show that the pattern of outputs that 
emerge from allowing efficient decentralized choice in this way increases social benefits relative 
to a centralized solution that imposes more uniform levels of outputs across all jurisdictions.23 
That principle thus establishes a general presumption in favor of decentralized decisions 
where the benefits and costs are limited primarily to a particular jurisdiction or locality. 
Moreover, this general prescription has received widespread acceptance. In Europe, the case for 
decentralization is known as the principle of subsidiarity; as such, it is explicitly integrated into 
the Maastrict Treaty for the European Union.24 In the United States, it is recognized more 
colloquially as an aversion to the one-size-fits-all approach. 
From this perspective, we can envision a system of environmental policymaking in which 
the central government sets standards and oversees measures to address explicitly national 
pollution problems and intervenes in cases (like acid rain) where polluting activities in one 
jurisdiction impose substantial damages elsewhere. In addition, the central government would 
provide basic support for research and the dissemination of information on environmental 
problems, since these are activities that benefit everyone. At the same time, decentralized levels 
of government would set their own standards and establish their own programs for managing 
those dimensions of environmental quality that are primarily contained within their own 
boundaries (for instance, the standards that a local landfill might have to meet). 
This basic view of environmental federalism has, however, been the subject of a 
fundamental challenge, at both the theoretical and the policy levels. The source of this challenge 
is the contention that local officials, in their eagerness to encourage new business investment and 
economic growth, will set excessively lax environmental standards to hold down the costs of 
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public issue should rest with the lowest level of government capable of handling the problem. More explicitly, the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 allows action at the union level “only and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community” (E.C. Treaty, Article 3B). It is interesting that the 
intellectual source of the principle of subsidiarity is papal social teaching; Pius XI held it to be morally wrong “…to 
assign to a larger and higher society what can be performed successfully by smaller and lower communities” (Inman 
and Rubinfeld 1998, 545).  Resources for the Future  Oates and Portney 
20 
pollution control for existing and prospective firms. The result will be a “race to the bottom” 
with inefficiently high levels of polluting activities. 
This turns out to be a quite complicated as well as contentious issue. There has emerged a 
large theoretical literature that explores interjurisdictional competition and its welfare 
implications.25 It has two sides. It is not difficult, on the one hand, to describe a world in which 
competition among governments for new business investment is welfare enhancing, where it 
leads to Pareto-efficient choices involving, among other things, levels of local environmental 
quality. Oates and Schwab (1988, 1991, 1996) have constructed a series of such models in which 
local jurisdictions compete for mobile firms both to increase levels of wage income and to 
enlarge the local tax base. These models generate a set of invisible-hand outcomes in which such 
competition induces local decisionmakers to select efficient levels of local outputs (including 
environmental quality). 
These models are, however, quite demanding in terms of some essential conditions: 
governments are small in the sense that they are price takers in a large capital market and do not 
engage in strategic behavior in response to the policy choices of other competing governments; 
they have access to the full range of policy instruments they need for efficient fiscal and 
regulatory decisions; and public outputs are wholly self-contained—they have no external effects 
on other jurisdictions. Within such a setting, it is not difficult to construct a rich model in which 
governments compete with one another for mobile firms by making use of expenditure, tax, and 
environmental policy instruments, and where the outcome for all these policy measures is Pareto-
efficient. Competition in such a framework is efficiency enhancing; in a kind of analogue to the 
case of perfect competition in the private sector, it guides public decisions into efficient 
outcomes. 
On the other hand, if any of these conditions are relaxed (often in quite realistic ways), 
the efficiency properties of these models of interjurisdictional competition can be compromised. 
Governments may not, for example, have access to the tax and regulatory instruments they need 
for efficient public management. An important line of work in the fiscal competition literature 
examines the case where local governments can tax only mobile capital, so that all public 
services must be financed by a tax on local firms (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986; Wilson 1986; 
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Wildasin 1989). In this setting, a kind of fiscal externality arises in that local officials do not take 
into account the impact that their policy decisions have on tax bases in other jurisdictions. The 
typical outcome in such models is one in which public services are underprovided. Distortions 
can also occur where governments are large in the sense of having an impact on the price of 
capital—or where they behave in strategic ways in the setting of policy parameters.  
Of direct relevance here is a public choice setting in which public agencies have their 
own set of objectives, including such things as budget maximization. If local officials seek to 
enlarge the size of the public sector, it is straightforward to show that they will tend to set lax 
environmental measures in order to attract more capital and enlarge the local tax base (Oates and 
Schwab 1988). More generally, there exists a large and rich literature, much of it drawing on 
game-theoretic models, that explores these issues and describes the sorts of allocative distortions 
that competition can generate in a variety of settings (Wellisch 2000).  
The theory of environmental federalism thus leaves us in an uneasy position. Although 
there are clearly ways in which economic competition among governments can encourage good 
fiscal and environmental decisions, there are also circumstances where things can go awry. And 
the important issue here is really one of magnitude: How large are the kinds of distortions that 
this literature describes? If they represent only small deviations from efficient outcomes, they 
may not be of much consequence. The problem is that we don’t know. There is plenty of 
evidence that governments actively engage in various forms of economic competition. But this 
really doesn’t address the issue. Such competition may, as we have discussed, be healthy in the 
sense of encouraging good public decisions. Thus, the discovery that governments introduce 
policy measures to influence industrial location really doesn’t tell us much about the kind or 
magnitude of any distortions (Courant 1994).  
When we look at the actual practice of environmental decisionmaking, we find that it has 
often tended to be centralized. In the United States, for example, the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1970, one of the cornerstones of federal legislation emerging from the environmental 
movement of the 1960s, directs EPA to set uniform standards for air quality—standards that 
must be met (or exceeded) in every part of the country. Moreover, these standards (in the form of 
maximum allowable pollutant concentrations) are to be set so as to protect the health of the most 
sensitive residents, with little regard to cost or other mitigating circumstances. In addition, 
Congress itself established tailpipe emissions standards that were to apply uniformly to all new 
vehicles sold in the United States (with the exception of California, which was granted the right 
to set more stringent standards). It is interesting that two years later, Congress introduced 
sweeping measures for water quality management that call for the states to set their own Resources for the Future  Oates and Portney 
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standards for water quality. But at the same time, Congress directed EPA to issue technology-
based discharge standards for all publicly owned sewage treatment plants and for virtually all 
industrial sources of water pollution. There is thus a real ambivalence that runs through U.S. 
environmental federalism.  
Likewise, the emerging European Union is struggling with the extent to which 
environmental measures should be harmonized across Europe and the extent to which such 
decisions should remain with the member states (Leveque 1996; Pfander 1996). As we 
mentioned, the principle of subsidiarity is generally recognized, but various types of arguments 
have convinced many that EU-wide standards are needed to address a range of environmental 
problems. In particular, there has been support in Europe for harmonization for purposes of 
encouraging the development of a common market. This makes some sense for product 
standards, without which one member state may exclude products of others if they do not meet 
its own health, safety, and environmental standards. From this perspective, a harmonized set of 
standards can facilitate the free movement of goods and services within Europe. This case is, 
however, much less compelling for so-called process standards, which relate to the conditions 
under which products are manufactured. The need for setting uniform standards for ambient 
environmental quality or uniform emissions standards at the EU level is much less clear. In fact, 
proponents of such measures in Europe, like their counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic, 
have relied heavily on race-to-the-bottom arguments. 
The Council of the European Union has extensive powers for environmental governance. 
It is authorized to issue directives to the member states on environmental matters, and according 
to Article 189 of the Maastricht Treaty, such directives “shall be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods.” The treaty thus gives the union the power to 
command the member states to meet centrally defined standards for environmental quality.26 
However, the council’s decisions still require de facto unanimity, so its powers are, in fact, quite 
circumscribed.27 Moreover, there is evidence that the member states have not always complied 
with these directives; the problem of enforcement remains a basic concern. 
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In terms of existing policy, there seems to be a good deal of confusion on both sides of 
the Atlantic. The degree of decentralization of environmental management differs significantly 
for various pollutants, often with little justification in terms of any apparent principles. 
Moreover, in Europe, attempts to centralize standard setting have been frequently undercut by 
the reluctance of member states to comply with the directives. 
Environmental federalism thus remains a highly contentious issue, in both theory and 
practice. The case for centralization relies heavily on the adverse effects of competition with a 
resulting race to the bottom. But does such a race really exist? The support for an affirmative 
answer to this question is largely anecdotal; to our knowledge, there is little systematic evidence 
of any such race. 
On the other side, there is some, if admittedly limited, evidence suggesting that there is 
no widespread race to the bottom. If there were fierce and distorting economic competition, we 
might expect to find few instances in which decentralized jurisdictions introduce environmental 
measures that are more stringent than the centrally determined standards. Yet in the United 
States at least, states have introduced regulations for the control of pesticides and hazardous 
wastes that go well beyond federal requirements. The one instance where the states have not 
gone beyond federal standards relates to the ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air 
Act. But our sense of this case is that the legislation calls for such stringent measures (standards 
so tough that there are no adverse health effects from air pollution irrespective of the costs of 
control) that few would want anything tougher.28 
Using another approach, three recent studies in the United States have examined the 
impact on environmental outcomes of the devolution of responsibilities for certain aspects of 
environmental management during the Reagan years. Although this covers an admittedly short 
time span, it is interesting that none of the three studies find any evidence of a race to the bottom. 
List and Gerking (2000), using state-level data, have estimated a fixed-effects model that looks at 
both levels of environmental quality and abatement expenditures. They find no evidence of any 
deterioration in environmental quality or decline in abatement efforts; on the contrary, they find 
some instances of improvements, leading them to conclude that “…in this instance, the race to 
the bottom did not appear to materialize.” In another assessment of the experience in the Reagan 
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era, Millimet (2000) has studied airborne emissions of sulfur dioxide and industry spending on 
pollution abatement. He finds that actual emissions were lower and abatement spending higher 
than forecast by his model, suggesting a race to the top. Finally, Fredriksson and Millimet 
(forthcoming) likewise find little impact of Reagan devolution on environmental policy; their 
results, in fact, provide evidence for a strategic race to the top among U.S. states.29 
The efficiency gains from environmental measures that are tailored to local 
circumstances may be quite substantial. In one study, Dinan et al. (1999) have examined 
drinking water standards in the United States. This is an interesting case for two reasons. First, 
the purity of local drinking water (with the exception of a couple of contaminants) is mainly of 
interest to local users, and any adverse effects manifest themselves only after prolonged 
exposure. We can thus reasonably characterize this as a local public good. Second, there exist 
large economies of scale in the treatment of drinking water such that the costs of additional 
purification per household can be much higher in smaller than in larger jurisdictions. The Safe 
Water Drinking Act of 1974 instructed EPA to set national standards. But as the authors find, 
uniform national standards can be quite inefficient. They examine the case of a particular class of 
contaminants—radionuclides known as adjusted gross alpha emitters—and find that the stringent 
EPA standard can be justified on benefit-cost grounds for only the very largest districts, where 
the costs can be shared among several hundred thousand households. For smaller districts, the 
standard has (often large) negative benefits. 
There remains, in our view, a strong case for localized environmental management where 
the benefits and costs of such measures are themselves localized. The potential efficiency gains 
may be large; moreover, there is little evidence of a destructive race to the bottom in 
environmental regulation.30 At the same time, we stress that there remains a crucial role for 
central government. In addition to addressing national pollution problems (where emissions cross 
jurisdictional boundaries), a central environmental agency can provide essential information and 
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research support. We can envision a system of environmental management in which a very 
active central agency not only supports research on environmental issues but also offers guidance 
in the form of recommended standards and levels of treatment that effectively lay out the menu 
of choices available to local decisionmakers. In such a setting, local agencies could then select 
the parameters for environmental programs that best suit their constituencies.  
6. Concluding Observations on Some Recent Trends 
In concluding our survey of the political economy of environmental policy, we want to 
call attention to the striking and fascinating evolution of environmental management over the 
past few decades—and in particular, to the role that economics plays in the design of new policy 
measures. In the early days of the environmental movement in the 1960s and early 1970s, there 
existed a strong disposition toward command-and-control approaches to regulation. Under these 
approaches, environmental agencies set standards with little regard to their economic 
implications and then issued directives to polluters, limiting their levels of waste emissions and 
often specifying the control technology. The economic prescriptions for the setting of standards 
by balancing benefits and costs at the margin and for the use of incentive-based policy 
instruments to achieve these standards were largely ignored on both sides of the Atlantic. But 
things have changed in some quite dramatic ways. 
First, new procedures have been introduced requiring the systematic measurement and 
sometimes consideration of the benefits and costs associated with policy measures. Pearce 
(1998) provides a careful description of the evolution of environmental appraisal procedures in 
the European Union. The Fifth Environmental Action Plan, promulgated in 1992 by the 
European Community, calls explicitly for “…the development of meaningful cost/benefit 
analysis methodologies and guidelines in respect of policy measures and actions which impinge 
on the environment and natural resource stock” (Pearce 1998, 490). Pearce (1998, 498) finds that 
“Since the early 1990s formal appraisal procedures have improved and are applied more widely.”  
Likewise, in the United States various presidential executive orders have called for 
benefit-cost analyses of all major environmental regulations.
31 The most widely publicized of 
these was Reagan’s 1981 executive order 12291, which required not only that benefit-cost 
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studies be carried out for all major regulatory programs but that, to the extent permitted by law, 
regulations be undertaken only if the benefits exceeded the costs. EPA has been making benefit-
cost studies of environmental regulations since the mid-1970s but has been limited by various 
statutes in applying them to actual decisions. We can do no more than note that in key parts of 
certain environmental laws in the United States, regulators are prohibited from even considering 
costs in setting ambient standards, while under other statutes, they are almost required to strike a 
balance between benefits and costs in standard setting. There is little consistency here. As 
Morgenstern (1997, 20) puts it, “Various statutes forbid, inhibit, tolerate, allow, invite, or require 
the use of economic analysis in environmental decisionmaking.”  
Second, there has been increased interest in, and some use of, incentive-based policy 
instruments for the attainment of environmental standards.32 The economic prescriptions for 
policy measures that were essentially ignored in the early days of environmental legislation are 
getting a much wider hearing in the current policy arena and are actually appearing in practice. 
The use of taxes to discourage polluting activities and the introduction of systems of tradable 
emissions allowances are now more than just ideas appearing in textbooks on the subject. 
What accounts for these modifications in the direction of environmental policy? This is 
not an easy question to answer.33 To some extent, the deficiencies associated with command-
and-control techniques have become more apparent over time, and the resulting dissatisfaction 
has stimulated the search for alternatives. In this context, economists who have increasingly 
turned their attention to environmental issues have played an important role both in educating 
policymakers and in becoming more active in the design and implementation of feasible policy 
measures. As we move down the path of environmental protection, we are finding that yet tighter 
controls on polluting activities are becoming increasingly expensive. And this puts a higher 
premium on finding efficient means for regulating them. But more generally, the last two 
decades has been a period of renewed “faith in market forces” (Kay 1988), in which perceived 
government failures have made the Western world much more receptive to market-based forms 
of regulation. 
                                                 
32
 Hahn (1989) provides an insightful history of the early efforts in the United States and Europe to introduce 
incentive-based policy instruments for environmental protection.  
33
Oates (2000) tries to answer this question in the context of the United States. It is clear in retrospect that some 
serendipitous events helped set the process in motion.  Resources for the Future  Oates and Portney 
27 
An interesting anomaly in this process of evolution is the rather different paths taken on 
the two sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, the tendency has been to turn to environmental taxes to 
provide incentives for reducing pollution.34 In contrast, regulators in the United States have 
adopted systems of tradable emissions allowances to control airborne emissions of sulfur 
dioxide, as well as some other air pollutants and other forms of damaging emissions.35 The 
reasons for this divergence in the choice of policy instruments is not altogether clear. But it does 
seem to represent to some extent the rather extreme aversion to new forms of taxation in the 
United States and perhaps some historical accidents as well (Hahn 1989; Oates 2000).36 
At any rate, the atmosphere for environmental regulation has changed dramatically. 
There is now attention given to incentive-based policy measures in many countries around the 
world. Indeed, serious consideration is being given to systems of tradable allowances on a global 
scale to address the problem of climate change (Hahn and Stavins 1995). Interest groups have 
found that there are ways in which incentive-based policy instruments can be constructed and 
implemented that make them worthy of their support (especially when these mechanisms’ cost-
minimizing properties can be used to fight for a more stringent standard than would be politically 
possible under a command-and-control approach). In addition, as we saw in several empirical 
studies, the relevant benefits and costs of environmental measures are by no means without 
effect on policy decisions; with the accumulating experience with environmental programs, there 
seems to be a discernible trend toward more efficient decisionmaking for environmental 
protection.  
                                                 
34
For useful treatments of the European experience with environmental taxes, see Brannlund and Gren (1999) on the 
Scandinavian countries, Smith (1995) on Britain and Germany, and Dijkstra (1999) on the Netherlands. The papers 
in Bluffstone and Larson (1997) provide an extensive description and analysis of the use of taxes and charges for 
pollution in the transition economies of Eastern Europe.  
35
Tietenberg (1985) provides a careful description and assessment of the U.S. Emissions Trading Program, a 
program that evolved in interesting ways to facilitate the trading of emissions allowances within air quality control 
regions. More recently, Ellerman et al. (2000) have described and analyzed the U.S. experience with sulfur 
allowance trading on a national scale to address acid rain. A smoothly functioning and efficient market has 
developed for the trading of sulfur allowances.  
36
 There are some exceptions. The United States did introduce at the federal level a tax on chlorofluorocarbon; in 
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